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RECENT DECISIONS

TAXATION -FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS-CAPITAL "ORIGINATING" WITH
THE WIFE-In 1937 petitioner, P, gave his wife and sister each $2500 worth of
stock in X Corporation. In I 940 he and A formed a partnership unrelated to
the business of X corporation. Later in ·the year they decided to incorporate
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this partnership. Meanwhile, P desired to obtain all of the stock of X in order
to take advantage of an opportunity to sell it to other interests at a substantial
profit. His ,wife and sister gave him their shares in X for his promise to give
them shares in the new corporation formed from the partnership of P and A.
A, who had objected to incorporation, finally persuaded P to continue the business as a partnership. P's wife and sister were each given an I I per cent interest
in the . partnership in lieu of the stock they had been promised. This was
the actual percentage of their respective monetary contributiov,s. A devoted all
of his time to the business and P, his wife, and his sister took no active part in its
affairs. In 1941, P reported 28 per cent of the profits as income and the wife
and sister 11 per cent each. The commission determined a deficiency, maintaining that P and not his wife and sister should pay the tax on the 22 per cent of
the profits they had reported. Held, taxpayer was taxable on only 28 per cent,
the other 22 per cent representing capital contributions originating with the, wife
and sister. S. E. Boozer, 1947 P-H Tax Court Memo. Dec. 47248.
Since the income of a partnership is taxed to the partners according to their
distributive shares, there is an obvious advantage, income tax-wise, in deflecting
a part of the husband's income to other members of the family by permitting
them to acquire a partnership interest in his business, provided the commissioner
will recognize the arrangement for tax purposes. In this connection, two broad
principles which had been developed by the Supreme Court competed for
recognition. One principle, formulated in Lucas v. Earl,1 is that a person
cannot escape the income tax merely by assigning his future income. The other
principle is that tax liability can be shifted by a conveyance of property
which produces taxable income. 2 Shortly after the :first principle was laid down
in the Lucas decision, the Supreme Court considered the taxable person question
in connection with a non-consensual family partnership--the legal !=ommunity.8
Here, in permitting a division of the community income for tax purposes, the
Court distinguished Lucas v. Earl. There Justice Holmes, speaking for a
unanimous Court, concluded that section 22 (a) taxed income to the person
who earned it. In the community property case, the Court concluded that this
reasoning did not apply because the earnings were always the property of the
·community in which the wife had a vested one-half interest. Two years later
Burnet v. Leininger 4 was decided. There a husband and wife agreed to divide
future gains ~d losses which might arise from his interest in a partnership.
The Court held that the husband remained taxable on the entire income derived from this inter!!st since the wife actually had not been made a partner within the contemplation of the statute. But in its opinion the Court did recognize
that income from a partnership was generally due to the services of the partners
as well as the capital investment. Consequently when the husband alone contributed services after an outright gift of one-half of his business to a member
of his family, the earnings of the business for tax purposes might have been
1

281 U.S. 111, 50 S.Ct. 241 (1930).
Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 57 S.Ct. 330 (1937); Alexandre, "The
Corporate Counterpart of the.Family Partnership," 2 TAX L. REV. 493 (1947).
8 Poe ·v."Seaborn, 282 U.S. IOI, 51 S.Ct. 58 (1930).
4
285 U.S. 136, 52 S.Ct'. 345. (1932).
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allocated in part to services and in part to capital inve_stment, and the partners
taxed accordingly. But instead, after the Leininger decision, the lower courts
resolved the conflict between the two principles indicated above by the exclusive
application of one or the other, the choice depending in each case on whether
capital was the substantial income-producing factor or whether the income was
due mainly to the husband's services.5 At this point the Supreme Court decided
Commissioner v. Tower. 6 The majority reasoned that where a husband,
who was an active partner, gave a partnership interest to a member of his family,
the taxable person question was decided by answering the same question which
the Court had posed in Lucas v. Earl: who earned the income? The Court
decided that it was the husband and concluded that the partnership arrangement would not be recognized unless the wife invested capital originating with
her, or substantially contributed to the control and management of the business,
or otherwise performed vital additional services. The principal case answers an
inquiry which would obviously arise in applying the doctrine of the Tower case:
How far will the Court go in tracing the capital contributed by the wife to
see if it "originated" with her? The decision shows that "originating" will not
be literally construed. The partnership will be recognized even though the
wife's contribution consists of property which she has previously received as a
gift from her husband, provided that the original gift from her husband was
not made as part of a pre-conceived plan to form a partnership later.7
Bayard E. Heath, S.Ed.

5 J. D. Johnston, Jr., 3 T.C. 799 (1944); M. W. Smith, Jr., 3 T.C. 894 (1944);
M. M. Argo, 3 T.C. u20 (1944); Earp v. Jones, (C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 131 F. (2d)
292, cert. den., 318 U.S. 764, 63 S.Ct. 665 (1943); Mead v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
5th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 323, cert. den., 318 U.S. 777, 63 S.Ct. 851 (1943);
Schroder v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 346.
6 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532 (1946).
7 The Tax Court handled the problem in this way prior to the Tower decision,
See, Walter W. Moyer, 35 B.T.A. II55 (1937); 0. William Lowry, 3 T.C. 730
(1944); Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T.C. 746 (1944). By deciding the principal case on
the question of whether the capital originated with the wife, the court implies that if it
had originated with her the husband would have remained taxable for partnership
income. This- would appear to be an extension of the position which the Tax Court
had taken prior to the Tower case, for here the husband's services did not contribute
to the partnership income. It is questionable whether this extension' i; warranted
by the language of the Tower decision.

